Islamic Muslim's Sharia Law: TAQIYYA

Islamic Muslim's Sharia Law TAQIYYA

Closely associated with shariah doctrine on lying is the concept of taqiyya, which is generally described as lying for the sake of Islam.

Taqiyya is a concept in Islamic law that translates as “deceit or dissimulation,” particularly towards infidels.

It is based on Quran 3:28 and 16:106 as well as hadiths, tafsir literature, and judicial commentaries that permit and encourage precautionary dissimulation as a means for hiding true faith in times of persecution or deception when penetrating the enemy camp.


Take, for example, Quran 3:28: “Let not the believers take the disbelievers as friends instead of the believers, and whoever does that, will never be helped by Allah in any way, unless you indeed fear a danger from them. And Allah warns you against Himself, and to Allah is the final return.” (Emphasis added.)

According to the authoritative Arabic text, Al-Taqiyya fi Al-Islam:

Taqiyya [deception] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream. … Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.150

The authoritative commentary on the Quran, Tafsir Ibn Kathir 151 notes the prohibition on “taking disbelievers as friends” then explains the Quranic phrase “unless you indeed fear a danger from them”:

The Prohibition of Supporting the Disbelievers. Allah prohibited His servants from becoming supporters of the disbelievers, or to take them as comrades with whom they develop friendships, rather than believers. Allah warned against such behavior when He stated… “unless you indeed fear a danger from them” meaning, except those believers who in some areas or times fear for their safety from the disbelievers. In this case, such believers are allowed to show friendship to the disbelievers outwardly, but never inwardly…. “We smile in the face of some people although our hearts curse them.”

Another authoritative Arabic text, Al-Taqiyya fi Al-Islam, states definitively the standing taqiyya enjoys in shariah:

Taqiyya [deception] is of fundamental importance in Islam. Practically every Islamic sect agrees to it and practices it. We can go so far as to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream. … Taqiyya is very prevalent in Islamic politics, especially in the modern era.152

A respected modern-day authority on Islam, William Gawthrop, has observed in connection with the practice of taqiyya:

Concealing or disguising one's beliefs, convictions, ideas, feelings, opinions, and/or strategies at a time of eminent danger, whether now or later in time, [is permissible] to save oneself from physical and/or mental injury. Taqiyya has been used by Muslims since the 7th century to confuse and split ‘the enemy.’ One result is the ability to maintain two messages, one to the faithful while obfuscation and denial is sent – and accepted – to the non-Muslim audience.153

It is worth noting how closely this language from Gawthrop’s “Islam’s Tools of Penetration” maps to the language used by Omar Ahmad, an unindicted co-conspirator154 in the HLF Trial when discussing separating the information role of CAIR from the operations role of the Holy Land Foundation. From the transcript of a secretly recorded meeting in Philadelphia which was identified as “Philly Meeting – 15,” and entered into evidence in the U.S. v. HLF trial,155

Ahmad had this to say regarding an information campaign against the United States:

Omar Ahmad: I believe that our problem is that we stopped working underground. We will recognize the source of any message which comes out of us. I mean, if a message is publicized, we will know…, the media person among us will recognize that you send two messages; one to the Americans and one to the Muslims. If they found out who said that – even four years later – it will cause a discredit to the Foundation as far as the Muslims are concerned as they say “Look, he used to tell us about Islam and that is a cause and stuff while he, at the same time, is shooting elsewhere.”

Ray Ibrahim, another contemporary scholar on Islam, quoted one of the principal Quranic authorities to address this circumstance:

Al-Tabari’s (d. 923) famous tafsir (exegesis of the Koran) is a standard and authoritative reference work in the entire Muslim world. Regarding [the Quranic Sura] 3:28, he writes: “If you [Muslims] are under their [infidels'] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally to them, with your tongue, while harboring inner animosity for them.…Allah has forbidden believers from being friendly or on intimate terms with the infidels in place of believers – except when infidels are above them [in authority]. In such a scenario, let them act friendly towards them.”156

Regarding 3:28, Ibn Kathir (d. 1373, second in authority only to Tabari) writes, “Whoever at any time or place fears their [infidels'] evil may protect himself through outward show.” As proof of this, he quotes Mohammed's close companion, Abu Darda, who said, “Let us smile to the face of some people [non-Muslims] while our hearts curse them”; another companion, al-Hassan, said, “Doing taqiyya is acceptable till the Day of Judgment [i.e., in perpetuity].”157

Taqiyya in Practice

A classic example of the shariah practice of taqiyya can be found in the dual messaging of Yousuf al-Qaradawi, best known as the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood. For an intended Muslim audience, he wrote in the Saudi Gazette on June 11, 2010:

…The acceptance of secularism means abandonment of shariah, a denial of the divine guidance and a rejection of Allah's injunctions….For this reason, the call for secularism among Muslims is atheism and a rejection of Islam. Its acceptance as a basis for rule in place of shariah is downright apostasy….158

At an earlier “Democracy and Political Reform” conference held in Qatar in June 2004, al-Qaradawi also declared: “There are those who maintain that democracy is the rule of the people, but we want the rule of Allah.”159

In these two instances, al-Qaradawi’s rejection of Western-style liberal democracy could not have been more clearly stated. He was making these statements in his role as an Islamic jurist, providing legal opinions specifically sourced back to the Quran and shariah. This is not the message he gives to other audiences, however. For instance, during a January 2010 interview in the Egyptian newspaper, Al-Shorouk, he saw advantage for the Muslim Brotherhood and shariah in extolling the virtues of democracy – as a means of ending the rule of President Hosni Mubarak (who mostly suppresses the Muslim Brotherhood) and bringing the Ikhwan to power: “Egypt will not regain its status, its wellbeing and its role unless it opens the windows of freedom. It must open the doors completely and make way for [new] figures and competition as real democracy is the solution, not fake [democracy].”160

Similarly, in the Brotherhood’s online forum, IslamOnline.net, which is published in English and aimed at a Western audience, al-Qaradawi went so far as to suggest that shariah actually embraces democracy: “Islam calls for democracy and grants people the right to choose their governor.”161 In short, what Muslim audiences are required to know about Islam is not the same thing as what non-Muslim Western audiences are allowed to know – or encouraged to think – by Islamic authorities. Taqiyya provides the legal basis under shariah for this sort of deceptive dual messaging.

The practice of taqiyya is sometimes erroneously described as one in which only Shiites engage. While it is true that the Shiites, being the minority sect in Islam, have historically had reason to engage in deception (i.e., to conceal their religious identity from the majority Sunni population who would otherwise persecute them), Sunni Muslims living in the West are themselves in the minority among societies full of non-Muslims. Shariah is permissive of their lying in such conditions.

Such examples from shariah sources should suffice to alert national security professionals to the mainstream position of Islamic doctrine on the subject of lying. In view of the Prophet Mohammed’s statement that “War is deceit,” and cognizant of the requirement under shariah for Dar al-Islam to be in a constant state of animosity, hatred, and jihad with Dar al-Harb until “all religion belongs to Allah,” it is imperative that those whose duty it is to protect the United States. from shariah grasp the centrality of taqiyya in the arsenal of its adherents.

This is critical because the consequences of taqiyya extend to real world issues related, for example, to Muslim overtures for interfaith dialogue, peace and mutual tolerance – all of which must be viewed in the light of Islamic doctrine on lying.

This is not an argument for trusting or mistrusting someone in any particular instance. It is, though, an argument for professionals to be aware of these facts, to realize that they are dealing with an enemy whose doctrine allows – and at times even requires – them not to disclose fully all that they know and deliberately to misstate that which they know to be the truth.

As is discussed at greater length below, American officials charged with national and homeland security have a duty to understand that which is within the sphere of their professional competence. For anyone with such responsibilities, knowledge of these attributes of Shariah is a requirement.

Islamic Muslim's Sharia Law: Permissible LYING

It is imperative that national security professionals with responsibility for defending the U.S. Constitution from encroachment by shariah understand that, under Islamic law, lying is not only permissible, but obligatory for Muslims in some situations. This complicates efforts to understand the true nature of the threat– and to have confidence in those Muslims at home and abroad with whom the government hopes to make common cause in countering it.

What is particularly confusing is the fact that shariah has two standards of truth and falsehood: In general, the Quran disapproves of Muslims deceiving other Muslims. It declares, “Surely God guides not him who is prodigal and a liar.”140 Yet, Quranic passages and statements attributed to Mohammed in reliable hadiths provide exceptions even to the usual prohibitions on lying to fellow Muslims.

For example, Reliance of the Traveler provides practical examples of where lying even to Muslims can be appropriate: “Giving directions to someone who wants to do wrong…” is one such example, explaining that “It is not permissible to give directions and the like to someone intending to perpetrate a sin, because it is helping another to commit disobedience.”141 Such disobedience, as understood under Islamic law, is defined as: “Giving directions to wrongdoers includes: (1) showing the way to policemen and tyrants when they are going to commit injustice and corruption.”142

Reliance also shows in quotes from Mohammed that there are other grounds for lying even to Muslims:

“He who settles disagreements between people to bring about good or says something commendable is not a liar.”143

And “I did not hear him permit untruth in anything people say, except for three things: war, settling disagreements, and a man talking with his wife or she with him (in smoothing over differences.)”144

These exceptions are sufficiently broad to cover most instances in which lying would be expedient. Shariah demands, moreover, that its adherents lie where it will be advantageous in dealings with infidels whose submission is an obligation. Consider the legal guidance provided in the authoritative Reliance of the Traveler. In Book R, “Holding One’s Tongue,” one finds sections on “Lying” (r8.0) and “Permissible Lying,”(r8.2).

These cite the iconic Islamic legal jurist Imam Abu Hamid Ghazali:

This is an explicit statement that lying is sometimes permissible for a given interest…When it is possible to achieve such an aim by lying but not by telling the truth, it is permissible to lie if attaining the goal is permissible (N: i.e., when the purpose of lying is to circumvent someone who is preventing one from doing something permissible) and obligatory to lie if the goal is obligatory.145

An example of the Quranic basis for the shariah standard on lying is: “Allah has already sanctioned for you the dissolution of your vows.”146 Indeed, in some places, it is Allah himself who is described approvingly as a capricious deceiver: “Say, ‘God leads whosoever He wills astray.”147

As noted above, Sahih Bukhari writes that Mohammed, too, authorized a permissive attitude toward telling the truth: “The Prophet said, ‘If I take an oath and later find something else better than that, then I do what is better and expiate my oath.”148

Besides lying, there is also guidance in Reliance about giving a misleading impression: “Scholars say that there is no harm in giving a misleading impression if required by an interest countenanced by Sacred Law.”149

Islamic Muslim's Sharia Law: APOSTASY

To understand what is meant by kufr, or unbelief, it is instructive to move on to Book O, “Justice” in the Reliance of the Traveller. In the Chapter on “Apostasy from Islam,” 135 it states:

• “Leaving Islam is the ugliest form of unbelief and the worst.”

• “Whoever voluntarily leaves Islam is killed.”

• “When a person who has reached puberty and is sane voluntarily apostatizes from Islam, he deserves to be killed.”

This is an absolute rule in shariah that does not admit of an alternate interpretation. Recall Abdul Rahman, the Afghan national who, in 2006, converted to Christianity. When the Islamic authorities found out about his conversion, Rahman was sentenced to death for apostasy. The European Union determined this was a human rights violation and they reacted by threatening to withhold five hundred million euros in economic aid from Afghanistan.

This created a significant political and legal issue for Afghan President Hamid Karzai. If he failed to put Rahman to death for apostasy, he would be violating Islamic law (and the Afghani Constitution in which shariah is the Law of the Land) and failing in his duty as a Muslim leader. If carried out the sentence, he would lose the European economic aid.

The solution: Rahman was declared insane.136 Under Islamic law, declaring a person insane is one of the only ways a Muslim leader (who is required to follow shariah) can avoid putting the apostate to death.

In the Western world, this would be an abominable human rights violation, but under shariah, it can be the only thing that allows the authorities to avoid imposing the death sentence that is prescribed by Islamic law for apostasy.

The enumerated reasons in shariah for declaring a Muslim an “apostate” include: “to deny any verse of the Koran or anything which by scholarly consensus…belongs to it” and “to deny the obligatory character of something which by the consensus of Muslim…is a part of Islam.”137 This means that Islamic law makes violation of scholarly consensus an unambiguous act of apostasy.

So, if one were to disagree with something where there is consensus among the scholars, one could be charged with apostasy and put to death. This shariah concept of “scholarly consensus” effectively precludes any effort to moderate or reform any element of shariah sustained by such consensus. Reliance underscores the magnitude of the crime of apostasy in Book C, “The Nature of Legal Rulings”138:

Here, the author notes, “Scholars distinguish between three levels of the unlawful:
(1) minor sins…;
(2) enormities…; and
(3) unbelief (kufr), sins which put one beyond the pale of Islam… and necessitate stating a Testification of Faith….”

The only way a Muslim who is declared a “kufr” can escape this is to recant and recite the Shahada the declaration of Islamic faith in Allah and the Prophet), thus declaring a new testimony of faith. He has tore-enter the Islamic faith, as it were.

As Louay Safi, a top Muslim Brotherhood member operating in the United States who is nonetheless considered by many officials to be a respected “moderate,” wrote in his 2001 book Peace and the Limits of War — Transcending Classical Conception of Jihad: “The war against the apostates is carried out not to force them to accept Islam, but to enforce the Islamic law and maintain order.”139

Safi then adds: Therefore, the individual apostasy which takes place quietly, and without causing any public disorder, should not be of concern to Islamic authority…. Only when the individual openly renounces Islam and violates Islamic law should he be punished for breaking the law.

In other words, Safi is saying, in effect: We do not put people to death for becoming apostates. We put people to death when we find out that they have become apostates. In the final analysis, defining elements of shariah are intolerant of any deviation. There is freedom of belief in Islam only to the extent that matters of individual conscience do not threaten the ummah, whose cohesion and public appearance of rigid compliance with shariah is paramount and takes precedence over any individual’s personal preferences.

The Sources of Shariah

What is Sharia?

The Arabic word “shariah,” according to one modern English-language student textbook on Islam, “literally means a straight path (Quran 45:18) or an endless supply of water. It is the term used to describe the rules of the lifestyle (Deen) ordained for us by Allah. In more practical terms, shariah includes all the do’s and don’ts of Islam.”71

The Sources of Shariah

There are four sources for shariah that make it authoritative: the Quran, the Sunna, ijma, and qiyas.

Deemed the “uncreated word of Allah,” the Quran reflects direct divine revelation and is understood to be the primary source of Islamic law. After the Quran, Islamic jurists next turn to the Sunna, considered to be indirect divine revelation arising out of the hadiths, or sayings or acts of Mohammed. Ijma refers to the con38 sensus of the grand mujtahids of the past, a historic process in which, once consensus attached, became a permanent part of the immutable body of Islamic law. Finally, the fourth source for shariah is qiyas, or reasoning by analogy, which applies an accepted principle or assumption to arrive at a legal ruling.

In order fully to understand shariah, it is necessary to examine each of these sources and their contributions in turn.

The QURAN: In Islamic parlance, the Quran is considered to be the uncreated word of Allah. According to Muslim belief, it has existed since the beginning of time and was revealed by the Archangel Gabriel in the 7th Century to the Prophet Mohammed in the Arabic language of his homeland.

The SUNNA: The second most authoritative source for shariah is the Sunna, commonly understood to be the actions and sayings of the Prophet. The Sunna includes the ahadith (plural of hadith), or collections by Mohammed’s contemporaries of what he did and said during his lifetime. Also within the Sunna is the Sira, which are biographical accounts of the life of Mohammed. It should be noted that the ahadith (not the Sira) constitute the legally significant element of the Sunna.81

The many hundreds of thousands of hadiths have been recorded in a number of Hadith collections, of which six collections are held to be the most authoritative or “strong hadiths,” meaning their chain of transmission is considered solid. The two most important collections of all are those by Sahih Al-Bukhari (collected and compiled by Mohammed bin Isma'il, known as Imam Bukhari, born 810, died 870) and Sahih Muslim (Muslim bin al-Hajjaj, known as Imam Muslim, born 817/818,died 874/87.Ijma:

In addition to the Quran and Sunna, there are also two accepted secondary sources for shariah: these are ijma (consensus of the scholars) and qiyas (analytical deduction. Consensus of the Islamic jurists refers to the achievement of agreement on particular legal issues and finds its justification in numerous verses of the Quran.82 Hadith accounts also provide support with the words of Mohammed: “My followers will never agree upon an error or what is wrong.” The early Muslim scholars turned to this device of ijma only when they could not find a specific legal ruling in either the Quran or the Sunna.

QIYAS: Qiyas make up the fourth most important source for shariah. The term means “to judge by comparing with a thing.” Its methods of deductive reasoning derive from the previous three sources of authenticity, namely the Quran, the Sunna, and ijma. When a legal ruling was required but could not be found in the other sources, the Islamic jurists employed analogy, reasoning, and legal precedent to arrive at new case law.

Although all four schools of Sunni jurisprudence (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, and Hanbali) accept IJMA as a legitimate source of shariah, Shi’ite Muslims do not; however, they replace ijma with aql (or reason. Considering that Shi’ites do not accept the authority of the Sunni Caliphs after Imam Ali, it is understandable that they would reject a source of legal authority that arose under their authority. In any case, the Shi’a practice of aql is essentially identical to ijma.